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Abstract  
It is now widely recognised that the socio-economic changes that ageing societies will bring about are 
poorly captured by the traditional demographic dependency ratios (DDRs), such as the old-age 
dependency ratio that relates the number of people aged 65+ to the working-age population. Future 
older generations will have increasingly better health and are likely to work longer. By combining 
population projections and National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data for seven European countries, we 
project the quantitative impact of ageing on public finances until 2040 and compare it to projected DDRs. 
We then simulate the public finance impact of changes in three key indicators related to the policy 
responses to population ageing: net immigration, healthy ageing and longer working lives. We do this 
by linking age-specific public health transfers and labour market participation rates to changes in 
mortality. Four main findings emerge: first, the simple old-age dependency ratio overestimates the 
future public finance challenges faced by the countries studied – significantly so for some countries, e.g. 
Austria, Finland and Hungary. Second, healthy ageing has a modest effect (on public finances) except 
in the case of Sweden, where it is substantial. Third, the long-run effect of immigration is well captured 
by the simple DDR measure if immigrants are similar to the native population. Finally, increasing the 
length of working lives is central to addressing the public finance challenge of ageing. Extending the 
length of working lives by three to four years over the next 25 years – equivalent to the increase in life 
expectancy – severely limits the impact of ageing on public transfers. 
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1. Introduction 
European societies are ageing. According to Eurostat population projections, the median age 
of the population in the EU will increase from 41 years in 2010 to 46.4 in 2040. At that time 
26.9% of the population will be 65 years or older. The well-known causes are increasing 
longevity and low fertility in European populations. The challenges to public finances, 
pensions and health care expenditure posed by this development are often framed in terms of 
the demographic dependency ratio, old-age burden or support ratio – essentially the ratio of 
older people to the working age population (World Bank, 1994; Cutler et al., 1990). 
The old-age demographic dependency burden, often defined as the number of people aged 
65+ over the number of people in the 20 to 64 years age group has sometimes been 
supplemented with the share of very old (defined as the number of 85+ over the working age 
population) to illustrate that public transfers in the form of health care are particularly large 
for this age group. Thus, the fact that we tend to live longer is often, at least implicitly, 
perceived as spelling decline, lower pensions and generally lower welfare.  
However, a growing number of authors have recently pointed to the fact that a measure based 
on chronological age alone is misleading in societies where longevity is increasing 
substantially with each generation (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007, 2010 and 2013; Lutz, 2009; 
Shoven, 2010; Barslund and Werder, 2016). Sanderson and Scherbov (2013) argue that it is 
more appropriate to use a measure such as prospective age, i.e. remaining life expectancy. 
Using prospective age, the ratio of old to young can more usefully be calculated by relating 
the number of people with less than 15 years of remaining life expectancy to the number of 
people (or some subset thereof) with more than 15 years of remaining life expectancy. Other 
measures exist that similarly account for changes in longevity (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2013).  
Building on this literature, Spijker and MacInnes (2013) have recently gone so far as to call 
ageing a ‘non-problem’, at least for the UK. They propose a more dynamic measure – what 
they call a ‘real old-age dependency ratio’. Instead of using chronological age, they relate the 
number of people with a prospective age of less than 15 years to the number of people in 
employment, arguing that the development in this ratio better reflects the 'old-age burden' and 
associated challenges. This can be seen as a dynamic version of the simple headcount 
demographic dependency ratio where age cut-off points are moved along with improvements 
in life expectancy. Measured this way, they emphasise that the real old-age dependency ratio 
has been falling since the 1980s for major European countries. In favour of measuring the old-
age burden by a prospective measure of age, such as the real old-age dependency ratio, rather 
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than one building on chronological age is the finding that some public transfers depend less 
on chronological age and more on prospective age. The cost of individual health care is closely 
related to proximity to death as opposed to years from birth (Felder et al., 2000; Bjørner and 
Arnberg, 2012). 
While acknowledging the broader point, Barslund and Werder (2014) have confronted this 
measure and, in particular, the value of `backcasting’ the real old-age dependency measure. 
They emphasise that National Transfer Accounts (NTAs) (Mason et al., 2006) show that for 
many countries pension transfers form the largest part of public old-age transfers until rather 
late in life. Until recently pension ages in many countries remained unchanged for decades 
with a downward trend in the average age of retirement (OECD, 2013). The real old-age 
dependency ratio may be too dynamic with respect to implicitly assumed behavioural changes 
regarding retirement and length of working life, whereas the traditional static old-age DDR is 
useful in measuring the economic challenges faced by an ageing society without behavioural 
changes. Moreover, relying only on a dynamic measure risks masking the policy challenge in 
changing individual behaviour, in particular related to retirement.    
Given this background, the contribution of this paper is modest. In essence our goal is to shed 
light on how NTAs can qualify the discussion surrounding ageing and the old-age burden 
along three important dimensions related to: health care spending and the concept of healthy 
ageing, measuring the impact of migration and longer working lives. These are three central 
building blocks when it comes to meeting the public finance challenges of ageing. In this 
context we emphasise the usefulness of NTAs to study relative magnitudes of impacts on 
public finances of different scenarios over a range of EU countries, as opposed to more detailed 
budgetary impacts provided by single country inter-temporal models (Storesletten, 2000; 
Schou, 2006; Hansen et al., 2015).  
In the course of this exercise we rely on NTAs to provide age-specific government (net) 
transfers, which allow for a more precise assessment of dependency ratios.1 It enables us to 
take account not only of changes in the composition of the population over 65, but also the 
composition of the working age population, and changes in the number and composition of 
dependent young individuals. When looking at the effect of healthy ageing and longer 
working lives, we link transfers to mortality rates via the given age-transfer link provided by 
the NTAs. In doing so we connect to the literature on prospective ageing and more dynamic 
dependency ratios (see Mason et al., 2015 for a similar approach). Working at an aggregate 
multi-country level and with a static framework, we acknowledge upfront the uncertainties 
surrounding the results. However, with NTAs becoming available for a growing number of 
countries, and the prospect of country NTAs with different base years and more detailed 
breakdown of transfers, which allow us to better validate assumptions, the present approach 
should yield additional insight into the policy challenges of ageing. 
As a preview to our results, we find that the simple old-age DDR overestimates the future 
public finance challenges faced by the countries studied. In some cases, for example Austria, 
Finland and Hungary, this is significant. Second, healthy ageing – keeping health transfers 
constant for a given mortality rate – has a modest effect except in the case of Sweden where it 
is significant. Third, the long-run effect of immigration is well captured by the simple old-age 
                                                     
1 Public net transfers for a given age group are calculated as the sum of monetary transfers (e.g. public 
pension) and the value of publicly provided services (e.g. part of health care costs covered by the 
government as well as e.g. defence spending and spending on the police forces) less taxes and fees paid 
for the use of public services.   
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DDR measure if the common assumption of immigrants being similar to natives is maintained. 
The immediate to short-term impact of immigration tends to be overstated by the simple old-
age DDR measure. Finally, increasing the length of working lives is central to addressing the 
public finance challenge of ageing. By linking government transfers to mortality, we project 
that extending the average length of working lives by around 3-4 years over the next 25 years 
– roughly equivalent to the gain in life expectancy – severely limits the impact of ageing on 
public transfers. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in the next section we briefly describe the 
concept of National Transfer Accounts and note important caveats that are relevant for our 
application. This is followed by an outline of the methodology employed. The main results are 
in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. National Transfer Accounts and population data 
The population statistics used in this article are the EUROPOP2013 projections produced by 
Eurostat,2 covering all 28 EU countries. We use the base scenario, but detailed assumptions on 
age-specific fertility, mortality and net migration are available to facilitate alternative 
projections. The projection horizon goes from the base year of 2013 to 2080, although results 
are presented only up to 2040. They are based on a convergence scenario where the key 
demographic contributors – fertility and mortality – are assumed to converge towards the 
same value in the very long run (Barslund and Werder, 2016). Core features are an increase in 
fertility for most countries (exceptions are Ireland, Sweden and France) and a further increase 
in life expectancy for all countries with convergence towards the value of low mortality 
countries. Migration projections are country-specific.  
The population projections are paired with NTAs for the seven countries for which they are 
available from the National Transfer Accounts project (Table 1).3  
Table 1. Countries covered and reference year 
Country Reference year 
Austria 2000 
Germany 2003 
Finland 2004 
Hungary 2005 
Slovenia 2004 
Spain 2000 
Sweden 2003 
Source: National Transfer Accounts project. 
The concept of NTAs is described concisely and in depth elsewhere (Mason et al., 2006; 
Prskawetz and Sambt, 2014; UN, 2013). Below we provide only the essential components for 
our application of them, together with a few caveats. 
                                                     
2 A detailed description of the EUROPOP2013 projections is forthcoming. A short description is 
available from Eurostat (2015) and European Commission (2014).  
3 See www.ntaccounts.org and Lee and Mason (2011). 
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In short, an NTA breaks down the most important aggregate flows on one-year population 
age groups for a given year. The flows include public and private consumption, income and 
transfers. The latter flow, transfers, which is the important component from the point of view 
of our analysis, is further broken down into transfers related to education, health care, 
pensions and other public and private transfers. This breakdown is done via information from 
micro surveys. Aggregates are calibrated by reference to related quantities in the system of 
national accounts.  
Using the information embedded in the age profile of public transfers in an NTA, it is possible 
to give a much more detailed description of the impact of changes in the population 
composition on the public budget. In particular, compared to the traditionally computed 
DDR,4 it is possible to assess the effect of changes in the composition of populations aged 20-
64 and 65+. Furthermore, as emphasised in Hammer et al. (2014), the age limits on when an 
individual is, on average, a net contributor can be endogenously determined from the transfer 
profiles.  
In this study we utilise one additional advantage of NTAs: the one-year age specific transfer 
profiles allow for a correspondence from mortality (or, almost equivalently, remaining life 
expectancy) via age to the net transfers in the base year. This allows us to link net transfers 
(and implicitly health status, retirement behaviour and related labour market participation) to 
mortality rates in the projection. As an example, Figure 1 shows net public transfers for 
Germany as a function of (the logarithm of) mortality rates in the base year for the German 
NTA, together with a mortality age plot. Unfortunately, age-specific transfers are not available 
beyond the age of 90.5 We take transfers to be constant beyond that age. 
Figure 1. DE net public transfers as a function of mortality (2013) 
  
Note: The RHS shows logarithmic mortality for each age in 2013. The LHS plots net transfers against 
logarithmic mortality based on the NTA for Germany in 2003 and the RHS plot. 
Sources: NTAs and Eurostat. 
  
                                                     
4 Throughout this paper, we refer to the DDR – the number of people aged 65+ over the number of 
people in the age interval 20 to 64 – as the simple DDR, the headcount DDR or the traditional DDR 
interchangeably.  
5 For Hungary, not beyond the age of 80. 
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Caveats and limitations 
There are important caveats to the use of NTAs. First, because NTAs build on the system of 
national accounts, they are only available with a time lag. This means that behavioural changes 
from recent reforms are not reflected in the data. As an example: the NTA from Germany is 
from 2003 (Table 1) and therefore predates the Hartz reforms and later reforms to the 
retirement age. Secondly, it is important to understand that they are strictly static in nature. 
Thus, the underlying assumption behind using an NTA for a given year to assess transfers in 
the future is that the world will ‘stand still’. In addition, our approach does not account for 
second-order effects from potential changes in equilibrium conditions; the return to capital 
and labour will change in response to changes in labour supply and capital accumulation. This 
is, of course, hard to justify for any scenario where the total population changes, but 
particularly so when measuring the effect of immigration. Thirdly, at present, NTAs are only 
available for a single year whereas, as is the case for national accounts, flows are subject to 
business cycle effects and therefore measured transfers are not necessarily structural. There is 
clearly a need for country NTAs for different years and at different points in the business cycle 
to assess the sensitivity of projection exercises to the base year. While these are clear 
limitations, some of them, like dependence of a base year, are not fundamentally different from 
the challenges posed by the calibration of overlapping generation models.   
3. Methodology 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate how far NTAs enhance our understanding 
of the challenges to public finances from population ageing. To this end our approach to 
measuring demographic and economic dependency is for the most part rather standard. The 
innovation lies in coupling transfers to mortality rates, as explained below. 
Demographic dependency ratios and healthy ageing 
Our baseline DDR measure (SC1) is the traditional count of people above the age of 64 divided 
by the size of the population between the ages of 20 and 64, i.e. what is normally considered 
the working age population (Table 2). To compare first with a transfer adjusted measure based 
on NTAs and second a transfer based measure where health transfers are adjusted for 
mortality (healthy ageing), we add two additional measures. The first (SC2) takes into account 
the fact that not only is the size of the older population increasing but its composition will also 
change towards a larger share of people over 85. This is partly a consequence of increasing 
longevity and partly because the baby boomers are moving into this 85+ category with time. 
However, it also accounts for the fact that the age at which net government transfers turn 
negative lies some years before the age of 65. In addition, the age at which contributions (in 
public finance terms) turn positive for young people is also endogenously determined by the 
NTAs. Finally, the NTA-adjusted DDR includes transfers to the young. Thus, if the size of 
young cohorts is falling, this increases the capacity to sustain a large number of older people 
from a public finance view. 
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Table 2. Main scenario definitions 
Name Description Definition 
SC1 Simple head count 
old-age DDR 
Population aged 65 and above 
Population aged 20 − 64
 
SC2 NTA transfer 
weighted DDR 
∑ #𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑖=1,..,100 × 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 × 𝐼{𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 > 0} 
∑ #𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑖=1,..,100 × 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 × −𝐼{𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 ≤ 0}
 
Where #𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 indicates population at age i, 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 are 
net public transfer at age i, and 𝐼{. } is and indicator function 
taking the value 1 if true and zero otherwise. 
SC3 NTA transfer 
weighted DDR with 
health transfers 
adjusted for mortality 
As SC2 but with the health transfer part of net transfers fixed 
for given mortality after the age of 55 or 65. This allows for a 
projection of health transfers given changes in age-specific 
mortality rates. 
 
The healthy ageing scenario (SC3) is a variant of the NTA-adjusted DDR. Here healthy ageing 
takes the form of keeping public net health transfers fixed for a given mortality rate from the 
age of 55 and over.6,7 This shifts the government health transfer curve outwards (Figure 2). 
One important implicit assumption is that there is no age-related component in (publicly 
financed) health care costs. This is likely to be a best-case scenario (Bjørner and Arnberg, 2012). 
Figure 2. Government health transfers for healthy ageing scenarios, Germany 
 
Note: Government health transfers in 2000 and in 2040 for healthy ageing scenarios from respectively 55 
and 65 year of age. Health transfers shifted by mortality from the age of 55 are difficult to see in the 
figure due to the overlap with the 65+ transfer shift line. Line is flat from the age of 90 in 2000 by 
construction (see main text above). 
Sources: NTAs and Eurostat. 
                                                     
6 Results from a healthy ageing from the 65 years scenario are also presented (see Appendix A), but they 
are not materially different. For most countries, the age 55-65 is on the relatively flat slope of the transfer 
curve (see Figure 2).  
7 Shifting along a curve of remaining life expectancies yields qualitatively the same results as with 
mortality. 
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Effect of immigration 
Immigrants tend to be younger than natives and therefore boost the working age population 
relative to the economically dependent population.8 This improves the economic dependency 
ratio, in particular if measured only as the number of older people over the working age 
population (Pianese et al., 2014). However, this simpler measure omits two important issues: 
first, immigrants, like natives, have children, which dampens the effect on the overall 
dependency ratio. Second, the profile of net public transfers is not constant over the working 
life. Young individuals below age 30 contribute less than 45 year olds because they earn less 
on average (see Appendix B). Thus, the net contribution by a young immigrant tends to be 
below the average contribution by the working age population. By using NTAs to capture the 
net transfers at each age, we are able to address how these two issues affect the impact of 
immigration on the dependency ratio.  
We supplement the simple demographic dependency ratio for the scenarios with and without 
projected migration with the NTA transfer adjusted DDR (SC2, above) and calculate this for 
both the migration and non-migration projections.  
Longer working lives 
In contrast to much of the literature on ageing and economic sustainability, the focus here is 
not implicitly on the retirement age. Instead, we seek to simulate a shift in retirement 
behaviour that follows projected developments in mortality. In practice this is achieved by 
linking total net government transfers to mortality for those aged 55 and over (Figure 3). The 
procedure is similar to the healthy ageing scenario described above. 
Figure 3. Net government transfers by age, Germany 
 
Note: Government net transfers in 2013 and 2040. 
While it is a somewhat arbitrary choice, the age of 55 is the age after which labour market 
participation started to drop off markedly at the time of the reference year (Table 3).9 
Furthermore, one way to interpret the proposed shift is to think of reforms which increase the 
                                                     
8 Under the standard assumption that immigrants are similar to natives in educational composition, 
labour market participation, health, etc.  
9 Labour market participation and employment rates are presently generally higher.  
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effective retirement age in line with the projected increase in mortality (life expectancy) 
without further pension compensation at retirement. We emphasise that this should not be 
interpreted as a projection since there has been no historical movement in labour supply 
response following decreasing mortality (Milligan and Wise, 2015). Rather, it is an estimate of 
the policy challenge.   
Table 3. Labour market participation at ages 50-54 and 55-59 in reference year for the NTA 
  
Labour market 
participation rates Employment rate 
 Year 50-54 55-59 50-54 55-59 
Germany 2003 81.4 65.9 74.3 56.4 
Spain 2000 66.5 52.7 61.8 48.9 
Hungary 2005 71.1 47.4 68.3 46.0 
Austria 2000 77.7 49.4 74.3 47.4 
Slovenia 2004 75.3 45.4 71.2 43.9 
Finland 2004 86.2 65.4 80.1 58.5 
Sweden 2003 87.5 81.6 84.9 78.4 
Sources: Eurostat. 
4. Results 
DDRs and healthy ageing 
The first thing to observe is that the simple headcount old-age DDR measure overestimates 
the public finance impact of ageing for all countries in the long run (2040), see Table 4. For 
some countries, namely Austria, Finland and Hungary, the difference is significant. The 
reasons are: the NTA transfer adjusted measure (SC2) takes the young into account and the 
young dependent population either declines (in some cases substantially) or increases much 
more slowly than the older dependent population. This slows down overall growth in the 
population requiring net government transfers. Second, for the countries considered in this 
study, government net transfers turn positive between the ages of 56 to 63 years. This age 
group is included in the NTA measure but not in the simple old-age DDR, which reduces the 
growth in transfers even if the share of 85+ year olds is growing (Table 5). This effect would 
diminish by setting the age limit for the simple DDR to 60 instead of 65. The difference in the 
denominator plays a smaller role, except for Spain, where negative net transfers from the 
working age population declines much faster than the headcount measure of 20 to 64 year olds 
(i.e. the denominator in the old-age DDR measure). 
The second thing we note is that there can be substantial differences in the short term. For 
Austria, the simple DDR considerably underestimates the population-driven changes in 
government transfers, whereas for Spain, Hungary and Finland the opposite is the case. 
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Table 4. DDRs and the impact of healthy ageing 
  
2013 2020 2030 2040 
Austria Simple DDR 1 1.09 1.39 1.69 
 NTA based DDR  1 1.13 1.40 1.53 
 Healthy ageing (NTA-based) 1 1.12 1.38 1.51 
Germany Simple DDR 1 1.13 1.48 1.82 
 NTA based DDR  1 1.15 1.51 1.71 
 Healthy ageing (NTA-based) 1 1.14 1.46 1.63 
Finland Simple DDR 1 1.26 1.48 1.48 
 NTA based DDR  1 1.12 1.23 1.27 
 Healthy ageing (NTA-based) 1 1.11 1.21 1.24 
Hungary  Simple DDR 1 1.20 1.39 1.59 
 NTA based DDR  1 1.05 1.15 1.40 
 Healthy ageing (NTA-based) 1 1.04 1.14 1.37 
Slovenia Simple DDR 1 1.26 1.68 1.96 
 NTA based DDR  1 1.21 1.54 1.77 
 Healthy ageing (NTA-based) 1 1.19 1.49 1.68 
Spain Simple DDR 1 1.17 1.52 2.05 
 NTA based DDR  1 1.12 1.46 1.94 
 Healthy ageing (NTA-based) 1 1.10 1.42 1.84 
Sweden Simple DDR 1 1.11 1.21 1.29 
 NTA based DDR  1 1.07 1.22 1.28 
 Healthy ageing (NTA-based) 1 1.05 1.15 1.17 
Note: Healthy ageing is based on constant health-related transfers for given mortality after the age of 55. 
Sources: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 and National Transfer Accounts. 
Turning to the healthy ageing scenario, what stands out is that there is a lot of country 
heterogeneity among the countries studied (Tables 4 and 5). The effect of scenario 2 (transfer-
weighted DDR) relative to scenario 3 (healthy ageing) depends on the change in the 
composition of the population aged over 65 and how much health care accounts for total 
transfers to the old. Since the latter is not constant across ages, the two effects also interact. 
How much the healthy ageing scenario will reduce the impact of ageing also depends on the 
steepness of the mortality (age)-specific health transfer curve. A steeper curve implies a larger 
impact from healthy ageing on the dependency ratio.  
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Table 5. Health care transfers (% of total transfers) 
 
Average share of healthcare 
in transfers  Share of 85+ in % of 65+ 
 2013 2013 2020 2030 2040 
Austria 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.16 
Germany 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.18 
Finland 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.22 
Hungary  0.19 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.18 
Slovenia 0.34 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.18 
Spain 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.17 
Sweden 0.36 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.19 
Source: Own calculations based on National Transfer Accounts. 
In Slovenia and Sweden, more than one-third of transfers to those aged 65 and over are health 
care transfers. In Germany, the corresponding number is one-fourth, whereas for Hungary 
and Spain it is close to one-fifth. Health-related transfers to older people in Austria and Finland 
constitute only around 15% of total public transfers. The countries are equally different when 
it comes to the change in the age distribution of the population above age 65 until 2040. Finland 
and Hungary will see an increase of close to 70% in the share aged 85 and over. For Slovenia 
the figure is 50%, and in Germany and Sweden it is increasing by one-third. Austria and Spain 
face a relative constant age distribution with the number of 85+ year olds increasing 
marginally faster than the overall number of 65+ year olds.  
For Austria, Finland and Hungary healthy ageing is projected to have little impact until 2040. 
These are the three countries with the lowest health share in overall transfers. The largest 
impact is for Sweden, where healthy ageing reduces the projected increase in the DDR by more 
than one-third. Minor effects are found in Germany, Slovenia and Spain.  
In sum, the simple headcount-based DDR tends to overestimate the effect of ageing on 
government transfers. The main reason is that transfers to the young are not accounted for. 
Healthy ageing is important for Sweden, but less so in other countries. Appendix A illustrates 
this and shows additionally a healthy ageing scenario from the age of 65. 
The effect of immigration 
Our starting point is the projected net migration from the baseline EUROPOP2013. All 
countries have projected positive net migration in the full period until 2040 (in fact until 2080), 
except Spain where net migration turns positive around 2025. However, the magnitude of 
projected migration relative to population varies among countries (Table 6). Sweden and 
Austria have projected annual net migration rates of around 0.5% of the population until 2040. 
Germany and Finland have somewhat lower numbers, while Hungary and Slovenia are 
projected to see net immigration of approximately 0.2%. Spain faces first emigration at a rate 
of 0.2% until 2025, with somewhat higher average rates of immigration until 2040. The 
assumed rates are above historical immigration rates for Austria, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia 
and Sweden. The age distribution of migrants is very similar across countries, with the bulk 
in the age bracket between 20 and 30 years old (Appendix B). 
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Table 6. Annual net migration assumptions in EUROPOP2013 
  
Avg. immigration 
rate 1990-2013 
(% of population) 
Immigration (% of population) 
2015 2020 2030 2040 
Austria 0.39 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.4 
Germany 0.35 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Finland 0.18 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
Hungary  0.15 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Slovenia 0.13 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Spain 0.62 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.5 
Sweden 0.37 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
Sources: Eurostat and EUROPOP2013. 
As a result of these assumptions of the EUROPOP2013 projection, all countries will show an 
improvement in the demographic dependency ratio relative to a situation without migration. 
Appendix B shows the age distribution of migrants relative to natives for all countries.   
Our main purpose is to explore the extent to which the use of NTAs and associated 
government transfers affects the changes in DDR from immigration. The underlying 
assumption relevant for the use of NTAs is that immigrants behave as the average national 
citizen (regarding fertility, mortality and labour market participation) and have the same 
average endowment with respect to human capital (i.e. same average wage) and savings.10  
The total impact on the DDR of the different countries will depend on the size of immigration. 
Table 7 shows the reduction in the change of the DDR relative to a zero-migration scenario. 
Thus, the 35% for the simple DDR for Austria in 2020 indicates that the growth in the DDR 
will be reduced by 35% relative to a situation with zero-migration. A 100% reduction would 
mean no future growth in the DDR. These are reported in order to illustrate the projected 
impact of immigration. The main results are the differences in impact from the simple old-age 
DDR measure and the transfer-adjusted measure of DDR, respectively. In a long-term 
perspective to 2040, there is little difference, depending on how the DDR is measured. The 
simple DDR headcount is a good proxy for the public finance impact when it comes to net 
migration.  
In the short term, focusing on 2020, the simple DDR tends to overstate the impact of 
immigration. Immigrants are young and thus their net transfer contribution is still low, but at 
the same time they are in the age range where fertility is relatively high, giving rise to negative 
net transfers from children (see Appendix B). For Hungary the results differ in the short term 
due to the age structure of immigrants, who are primarily (even) younger than working age.  
 
                                                     
10 This is not, of course, an innocent assumption (Sébastien, 2011). However, exploring the extent to 
which relaxing this assumption would change the outcome is beyond this study (see Schou, 2006; 
Hansen et al., 2013 and Ruist, 2014).  
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Table 7. Improvement in the simple DDR and government transfer-weighted DDR (%) 
from immigration relative to a zero-migration scenario 
  2013 2020 2030 2040 
Austria Simple DDR 0 0.35 0.31 0.36 
 DDR with NTA 0 0.22 0.30 0.40 
Germany Simple DDR 0 0.17 0.17 0.22 
 DDR with NTA 0 0.08 0.14 0.21 
Finland Simple DDR 0 0.14 0.22 0.32 
 DDR with NTA 0 0.17 0.27 0.36 
Hungary  Simple DDR 0 0.09 0.14 0.19 
 DDR with NTA 0 0.18 0.20 0.20 
Slovenia Simple DDR 0 0.07 0.11 0.18 
 DDR with NTA 0 0.04 0.12 0.21 
Spain Simple DDR 0 -0.06 0.01 0.11 
 DDR with NTA 0 -0.16 -0.07 0.06 
Sweden Simple DDR 0 0.31 0.42 0.49 
 DDR with NTA 0 0.25 0.30 0.41 
Sources: Own calculations based on EUROPOP2013 and National Transfer Accounts. 
Longer working lives 
Securing the future sustainability of public finances will have to rely on longer average 
working lives. This means that the statutory pension age will have to increase in many 
countries. However, the statutory pension age is not a good metric for assessing length of 
working life because the average retirement age in many countries is well below the statutory 
retirement age. In a richer model environment focusing on country-specific features, 
assumptions can be made or behaviour modelled on how increases in the statutory retirement 
age will impact the average length of working life. From this, one could estimate the increase 
in the number of people working and relate this to the number of pensioners (e.g. Martín, 2010; 
Fehr et al., 2012; Staubli and Zweimüller, 2013; Lassila et al., 2014). There are numerous policy 
challenges related to extending working lives. Our approach is different and we do not 
consider the policy challenge. Instead the focus is on the potential. We relate the net public 
transfers, excluding health transfers, of people older than 55 to their mortality rate in 2013. 
Future behaviour with respect to retirement and labour market participation, but also the 
pension system as such, is then projected from the mortality rate. This is somewhat in the spirit 
of Shoven and Goda (2010), who suggest age limits related to retirement linked to mortality 
developments. 
For the seven countries considered here, the shift in the transfer curve is equivalent to a shift 
in behaviour of around five years. Thus, in 2040, a 60 year old is assumed to have the same 
behaviour – in particular with respect to the labour market – as a 55 year old had in 2013.11  
                                                     
11 Informally, we think of this as the average individual maintaining his or her labour market 
participation behaviour from 55 to 60, but without any compensation in the form of higher pensions.       
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Based on Eurostat labour force statistics, we make assumptions about labour force 
participation for the reference year of the country’s NTA (see. Table 3) and assume that the 
difference between labour force participation and employment is structural in the reference 
year. To arrive at the implied increase in average working life for each country, the labour 
market participation rate is multiplied by the implicit number of years, close to 5 for all 
countries, the transfer schedule is shifted (Table 8). 
Table 8. Increases in length of working life 
 
Referenc
e Year 
Labour market 
participation rate 
Extension of 
working life, years 
Duration of working 
life, base year 
Germany 2003 73.7 3.7 34.3 
Spain 2000 59.6 3.0 31.6 
Hungary 2005 59.3 3.0 28.0 
Austria 2000 63.6 3.2 34.6 
Slovenia 2004 60.4 3.0 33.2 
Finland 2004 75.8 3.8 36.4 
Sweden 2003 84.6 4.2 38.5 
Source: Eurostat. 
The impact on demographic dependency ratios from an increase in working lives is 
substantial. In Germany, Spain and Austria the expansion of the demographic dependency 
ratio is diminished by around two-thirds. In the case of Finland the DDR will be no bigger in 
2040 than it is today. The same is almost the case with Sweden, where the DDR will only grow 
10% towards 2040 in this scenario. For Slovenia the impact is somewhat less significant. 
Table 9. Improvement in the transfer-adjusted DDR (%) in the longer working life scenario 
 2013 2020 2030 2040 
Austria 0 0.63 0.58 0.64 
Germany 0 0.78 0.71 0.68 
Finland 0 0.73 0.83 1.06 
Hungary  0 2.55 2.01 1.50 
Slovenia 0 0.32 0.34 0.40 
Spain 0 0.71 0.63 0.62 
Sweden 0 0.91 0.80 0.91 
Note: Effect of a longer working life scenario measured by the reduction in the growth of DDR towards 
2040. 
The reported scenario for longer working lives builds upon the scenario with immigration, as 
outlined above. If the healthy ageing scenario is added, some additional percentage points’ 
reduction in the increase in the DDR is obtained (see Appendix C for full results). 
Extending working lives is of central importance to meeting the fiscal challenge of ageing. For 
most countries the effect of working longer dwarfs the potential available in increasing 
immigration or healthy ageing. Appendix D shows the effect of each instrument against the 
baseline of zero net migration.  
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5. Conclusion 
This study shows that one has to be careful when assessing the impact of population ageing 
by the simple headcount measure of the demographic dependency ratio. Using National 
Transfer Accounts, we find that it can significantly distort the challenges faced – in a negative 
direction. While it obviously has to be present in the policy mix, and being something we all 
wish for, healthy ageing is unlikely to make much of dent in the increase in net public transfers. 
Considering only the impact of immigration, the simple DDR goes a long way towards 
accurately portraying the impact. However, the assumption normally used for assessing the 
impact of immigration, i.e. that immigrants have the same characteristics as nationals, is of 
course much contested in the literature. 
Furthermore, we have taken the literature on prospective ageing as a starting point for 
defining a scenario of longer working lives. This is done by keeping behaviour constant for a 
given mortality over the projection period for the population aged 55 and over. The result is 
an increase in the average length of a working life by 3 to 4 years. For most of the countries 
studied, this makes a decisive reduction in the increase of projected net public transfers. 
Finally, we stress the uncertainties involved in such multi-country macro projections, but 
believe that the methods used here can be useful when comparing countries and in assessing 
the broad impact of policy initiatives. As National Transfer Accounts become available for 
more and more countries and for more years, there is further scope for cross-validation of the 
results and assumptions made in this study. 
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Appendix A. National transfer accounts and demographic dependency ratios 
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Appendix B. Age structure of migrants and natives together with government net transfers 
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Appendix C. Combined effect of migration, working longer and healthy ageing 
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Appendix D. Effect on dependency ratios of different instruments 
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